Why does armenia want nagorno karabakh

Though the role of other countries, including Turkey and Russia, is central to both escalation and resolution in this conflict, at the heart of the struggle are the people who still live in the contested territory. We conducted face-to-face public opinion surveys in Nagorno-Karabakh in , , and most recently, in February As the future hangs in the balance, what do the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh think about the political status of their territory, and the world around them?

The conflict emerged in the waning days of the Soviet Union as a struggle for self-determination. But as in many such struggles, disagreement remains about what political outcome people want — a tension which can be an obstacle to resolving conflict. The surveys in of people and of 1, people were fielded by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia.

Our surveys reveal enduring splits among the Karabakh Armenians as to whether they want independence or unification with Armenia. Under the administration of former president Donald Trump, the U. In Baku, despite a public dressing-down from Aliyev, they received the message that their work would continue.

In Yerevan, they were welcomed more warmly. But their future agenda is still up in the air. Despite a previous tradition of visiting Karabakh itself, the co-chairs did not visit the region in December, after both Baku and Yerevan insisted that they should enter the territory from their side and refused to compromise.

It is far from clear who will now be negotiating with whom. Yet, Baku has no obvious interlocutors among the Karabakh Armenians, having accused most of their leaders of criminal activity.

Overarching this is the unresolved issue of status, which has been the crux of the dispute for more than a century. Over recent decades mediators have a tried to formulate a new status for the Armenians of Nagorny Karabakh within the borders that were drawn for the former Soviet-era Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Region in Formally, as far as Baku is concerned, the region no longer exists but is divided up between different Azerbaijani districts.

The Armenian side did not embrace it strongly before the conflict and the Azerbaijani side has disavowed it as a result of the conflict. As long as I am President, there will be no status. A new role is needed for not only for the Minsk Group co-chairs but for the OSCE mission operating in the region, the civilian team led by Polish diplomat Andrzei Kasprzyk since Formally mandated by the OSCE chairperson-in-office a rotating position held in by Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde , this mission remains the main internationally sanctioned presence in the region.

For more than two decades, its main function was to monitor the ceasefire line, a role now superseded by the latest war. However, the team can still usefully monitor the situation on the international Armenia-Azerbaijan border, which is not the responsibility of Russian peacekeepers. It can also usefully act as neutral international eyes and ears to report on civilian complaints in the conflict zone, monitor unauthorized or suspicious activities, and mediate local disputes.

This mission was originally conceived as more than a monitoring mechanism and could now work to implement neglected parts of its mandate , without the need for new authorization. International actors from outside the region, notably countries of the European Union and the United States, which have always supported a peaceful resolution of the conflict were sidelined during the recent fighting and their standing fell in the region.

These countries now seek a role for themselves in a new challenging environment. The new administration of U. President Joe Biden is likely to seek a more active role, but it will have to do so through what is bound to be somewhat awkward collaboration with Russia. On the other hand, the European Union has never had a direct role in this conflict, which predates its emergence as a diplomatic and political actor in this region.

The new, more dynamic post-ceasefire landscape affords it new possibilities to operate both in support of an OSCE diplomatic process and in parallel to it. Western actors and international organizations can seek to engage in two main activities.

One is economic assistance—so long as this is embedded in a clear-eyed political strategy that supports a sustainable peace for the region. The November agreement potentially opens up an opportunity to envisage the South Caucasus anew, with new transport connections and economic cooperation possible for the first time since the Soviet era. There are plans for a restored road and rail connection between Nakhichevan and the rest of Azerbaijan via Armenia.

Armenians may also be able to travel from Yerevan to southern Armenia and Iran via Nakhichevan, a much easier route than the highland roads of Armenia. All this, however, will be difficult without political rapprochement. This calls for a triple agenda of assisting the huge task of reconstructing and resettling the de-occupied Azerbaijani territories, providing assistance to Armenian-administered Nagorny Karabakh, and supporting region-wide transport links and economic connectivity.

The Azerbaijani leadership has so far made commitments only to a few high-profile projects there. Aliyev has already initiated a new six-lane kilometer highway from Fizuli to Shusha. He has laid the foundation stone of a new international airport in Fizuli and said that it would start operating in He announced that a second new airport would be built in Kelbajar or Lachin District.

These announcements look rather premature, preceding the launch of a wider program for the territories or any public consultation on how this will happen. It documents plans to rebuild settlements over 11, square kilometers and resettle up to , people. An extensive program of demining, refurbishment of utilities, and reconstruction is needed before former residents can return, something that could take several years. How can all this be paid for?

Azerbaijan is in a difficult economic climate , weathering the problems of falling oil production and modest international oil prices, as well as the costs of the global pandemic. It is unlikely to be able to afford these projects on its own. Azerbaijan also has a record of systemic corruption, which makes it unlikely that all the money in a massive reconstruction project would be spent scrupulously. This is where the EU, UN agencies, and international financial institutions such as the World Bank, European Investment Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development could pledge funding, as well as the expertise they have accumulated in other postconflict situations such as the Balkans.

Previously, Azerbaijan has sought to restrict international access to Karabakh itself but could be prevailed upon to rethink this policy if this access is part of a wider international economic assistance program for the de-occupied territories, harnessed to an agenda of normalizing relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Gas and electricity supplies have been reduced. Its two main towns, Stepanakert which Azerbaijanis call Khankendi and Shusha or Shushi , which used to rely on one another for water and electricity, are now in rival hands. The newly liberated Azerbaijani Kelbajar and Lachin Districts are also likely to struggle to survive economically, unless they can get energy resources and goods from Armenia and Karabakh.

Economic connectivity needs to be seen to work for all. This was pointed out in no uncertain terms in a recent statement by a coalition of civil society organisations not associated with the nationalist opposition.

Much of the latest movement on the border may have to do with Azerbaijan maximising its positions in preparation for upcoming negotiations on a final settlement of the conflict. Azerbaijan wants Armenia to face it across the negotiating table as weakened and insecure as possible, facing a series of accomplishments whose reversal would command a correspondingly high price.

But the CSTO has revealed itself as the empty box many suspected it to be, both during the war, and during the recent border episodes. Official appeals by Armenia citing several CSTO provisions prompted barely a whimper from what is essentially a Moscow-sponsored facade of an alliance. However, experts note Azerbaijan has been careful not to attack civilian areas in Armenia proper. Azerbaijan also says Armenia is shelling the industrial town of Mingachevir along with the smaller ones of Tartar, Barda, and Beylagan.

Hundreds of civilians have suffered through the fighting, many forced from their destroyed homes and now living under constant threat of injury or death.

And then I heard a boom. Civilians from both Armenia and Azerbaijan are caught in the crossfire of the conflict between the countries over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The question now is how all this ends. Experts have some ideas, but few have much immediate hope. The first is Russia diplomatically intervenes, like it has in past squabbles, and gets both sides to calm down.

Experts say neither side wants to unilaterally deescalate, but they could use the excuse of Moscow forcing them to pull back as a way out of this war. After seeing just how bad things have gotten, Russia could choose to revitalize the Minsk Group-led peace process, hopefully putting all sides on the path toward a diplomatic solution. Indeed, the language used this time around is far more severe than in the past, and Azerbaijan clearly looks more serious about making real gains. Another scenario is that Russia pushes Armenia to back off while Turkey convinces Azerbaijan to do the same.

That would mostly follow the trajectory of past skirmishes that ended in a shaky ceasefire. This is likely the outcome Turkey most wants. If Ankara proves instrumental in a new ceasefire, it will have solidified its place as a major player in the Caucasus that must be consulted any time Nagorno-Karabakh issues pop up.

There are even reports Turkey shot down an Armenian warplane last week , a charge Ankara denies. The sad reality is that, for the time being, the most likely outcome is that Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to fight.

That means potentially hundreds more troops and civilians will die. Trying to achieve such victories would no doubt lead to takeovers of civilian areas currently in one country by the other side. That, experts say, is a horrifying prospect.

Such scenes might entice Turkey and Russia to step in militarily by backing Azerbaijan and Armenia, respectively. At a minimum, such decisions would further exacerbate the fighting for more months and potentially years — an outcome few actually want.

Still, the risk of that happening is why this conflict is so fraught and why experts hope it will ultimately be resolved once and for all, preferably by diplomacy.