What do ethical theories attempt to do

Even though there are some commonalities in almost every moral theory we find an expression of the principle of no harm , as we find in every grammar a differentiation between subject and object, for example , the point remains that they serve to highlight different aspects of a situation as morally relevant.

We are now in a position to tighten up his concept: if we need orientation for decision-making in groups, we should play the contractualist card; if we need orientation in the intimate sphere, we should play the virtue ethics card, and so forth. Footnote 25 There are situations that one theory can help to resolve and another not. Footnote 26 So, to answer the question of which moral theory is the right one in a given context, the first step to take would be to follow the guidelines concerning different strengths for different contexts.

We can extract from the roots of virtue ethics a fruitful conception of virtue: virtues help us to arrange a more or less well-ordered personal cosmos. We can extract from a version of contractualism the idea that equality combined with a joint project presupposes common decision-making that integrates valuing the community and therefore paying attention to the common will. We can learn from Kant to always value the ability to reason practically and to act out of our rational capacities.

And we can extract from consequentialism the idea that instrumental reasoning is the kind of practical reasoning we are committed to in cases of fulfilling an antecedently determined goal. So far, we could be tempted to say: A moral theory is good or, better than another one if it ensures orientation in decision-making when needed. But here the analogy to language runs out; it is questionable whether the justification of a moral theory can and should ultimately be purely pragmatic.

Perhaps what enables us to get along best in practice is morally mistaken? What we have so far is not enough: we need a metatheory, to tell us when to release the clutch, work the gear shift, and bring a different moral theory to bear. We need a criterion that lets us decide when one or another theory should go into effect. How do we decide which one to choose? To ask for the specific strengths and functions of a moral theory is to ask what it is good for.

But that again is a normative question. Exclusion is sometimes called for on the basis of consistency or elegance, sometimes of the scope of application, but often it will actually be due to normative considerations. Thus it may seem we need to think about normative criteria for counting a theory as moral. Footnote 27 But that would only move the initial question to another level and — again — ask what morality is in order to find a systematization of it.

Given that we do not have a precise and perfected understanding of morality to start with, I propose to go at it from a different angle: What can we say about criteria for excluding or choosing a theory? The remaining pages will serve to determine three minimal aspects the criteria we are after have to address: It must help us to set respective scopes of application to the moral theories; it must allow for further and new moral theories; and at best it would be self-limiting.

Discussions of classical moral theories reveal not only strengths, but also weaknesses. Time and again the thought reappears that Kantian deontological ethics, with its reputed rigidity and inelasticity, cannot do justice to an environment that demands versatility, and to the moral questions and dilemmas with which we find ourselves confronted; to apply deontological ethics in some contexts thwarts moral action because the procedure is too rigorous — it is important to leave room for exceptions of benevolence, for example.

The answers found by virtue ethics can blind us to those rules that should be followed by everyone — sometimes generalizability matters. Consequentialism leads to coarseness when we fail to value autonomy and personhood in contexts in which they are at stake.

On the contrary, to find their limitations is to ensure their applicability. To see the scope of its application and to find its defeaters helps us use and understand a moral theory appropriately. New developments will raise new questions, and so press us to find new guidelines for acting — and future moral theories will reconceive morality in fundamentally different ways.

It is to be expected not only that new variations on the classical moral theories will arise, but also that fundamentally novel concepts will emerge. We must make room for further moral theories and for practical reasoning that enables us to find and invent new values. Who knows which moral questions and approaches to answers may prove beneficial, in the situations in which humans will find one day themselves, situations we cannot even imagine today?

And that again means that we need not only to assess the existing different theories with their strengths, weaknesses and appropriate field s of application, but to make room for new moral theories. Openness is mandatory. These two complications suggest a first approach which leads us to a necessary condition on choice between moral theories. My tentative final proposal is: self-limitation matters; and freedom is a good example for a relevant and promising candidate.

It has been proposed to assess moral theories on the basis of fit for particular problem-solving domains. If we turn to the question of metatheory, that is to the question of which criteria to invoke to choose between moral theories, the corresponding thought would be to choose the one best suited to that domain, that is, to pick out one rather than another moral theory for a particular application.

At this point we want to avoid at least one thing: an infinite regress. We do not want to find various criteria that are, firstly, finite, concrete, and exclusive, and that, secondly, come with a claim to be all-embracing. The challenge of choice on the first level arose because moral theories are generally supposed to be mutually exclusive and all-embracing; if the selection criteria were self-limiting, we would at least prevent this regress.

A self-limiting criterion is one that entails constitutive limits, i. Freedom is self-limiting in the sense that, even if there were no value worth restricting our freedom for, for freedom to prevail it has to limit itself: The best reason to limit freedom is the enabling of freedom.

When we have to choose between different moral theories, we should give priority to the theory that preserves openness and freedom. There are various contexts and situations in which more than one moral theory is equally helpful.

If there is a drowning child to be saved easily, you will come to the conclusion that you should rescue it, whichever moral theory you consult. But given the different areas in which we are engaged in our everyday and moral life, and which ask for different foci, we should embrace polyphony and be thankful that we have several moral theories at our disposal.

When we face different demands, depending on which theory we apply, we should look to their strengths and weaknesses, and turn to the option with the most adequate moral assumptions for the specific context, while making sure that we promote and respect the possibility of inventing new ones.

It seems advisable to be oriented towards selection criteria that comply with maintaining openness and meet self-limitation — as, for example, freedom does. It is almost impossible to provide more than these very rough statements about what moral theories are in general: any further specification would be applicable to one theory, but not another.

Because of the fundamentally different views on morality that different moral theories convey, we cannot give a definition of moral theory as we could give one of car , expecting to fill in further details as we descend to particular variations on it. It is controversial if even this categorization is appropriate see, for example, Crisp for an argument that virtue ethics should not be considered as a standalone theory, but rather as a form of deontology , and we have to be aware that considerations typical of one family of moral theories also figure into moral theories that seem to fit in another group.

We differentiate between different groups of moral theories in which the several concepts have different weights; although we know that categorizations often involve simplifications and a sacrifice of precision, we can seek out basic assumptions that can be assigned to different groups of moral theories. In philosophical discussion, in particular in the philosophy of science, we find several criteria for the correctness and acceptability of theories.

Some of these criteria also matter in the assessment of moral theories, such as complying with the rules of logic, being consistent, not being unnecessarily complex, and making explicit and concise use of terms. Furthermore, moral theories are, as other theories too, supposed to help us understand somewhat more about the object of investigation. Other criteria are not transferable: An empirical but not a moral theory should enable predictions about the future.

There are fundamental differences between empirical theories in general and moral theories in particular, what means we will need distinct criteria for the appropriateness and success of moral theories. To find them, we have to know what we expect from moral theories — besides the satisfaction of a vague desire to understand morality better. Thus, the discrepancies between moral theories are deeper than those between different maps of the same terrain. It is not that different elements of topography are being highlighted in different moral maps, but that the moral reality is perceived differently.

Moral theories do not only accentuate different factors available in principle in all representations — they are different interpretations of what is allowed and what is owed, and so actually depict another landscape for example one which is designed in a way that the notion of rights is appropriate, or not.

As far as I can see, similarities and differences between morality and language have been so far examined with other objectives and priorities. It is noteworthy that the discussion of LA is located mostly within or at the intersection of moral psychology and descriptive morality.

See also the discussion between Sripada and Harman, concerning the innate bases of certain aspects of morality Harman ; Sripada Harman notes various indications that speak in favor of developing an analogy between languages and moralities. The Whorfian hypotheses about the relationship between human language and human thinking are controversial, especially those that might suggest that some natural languages are better for talking or thinking about some kinds of things, and others for others.

It has to be noted that in the context of moral theories it would make no sense to engage in a discussion of a natural or innate superiority of any group or person behind a moral theory. However, researchers in other disciplines cannot simply rely on just any empirical data to falsify a theory.

Even in physics, not every observation that does not fit a theory is simply a reason to reject the theory. Of course, experiments and empirical verification play another role in descriptive ethics: If we want to know how widespread specific principles are, we can perform field research. But if we take for granted that how widely accepted a principle is has nothing to do with whether it is correct, we cannot go out and observe which one is morally right.

Moral theories as we are construing them here are not part of descriptive ethics. Meisenburg and Gabriel note for example the loss of morphologically marked cases as one of the most typological features that vary from Romanic languages to Latin.

Note that an Existentialist has no difficulties here if he assumes that we create the values in relation to the actual world we are living in, as Sartre describes it in Being and Nothingness.

In a nutshell, he claims that morality has to be about welfare; but that is not enough because we also need justice; the method of reflective equilibrium cf.

Nelson Goodmans introduction to this method in Goodman allows us to design a theory that collects thoughts both on justice and on welfare, accounting in addition for commonsense intuitions concerning morality, and thereby combines more abstract concepts like justice with pragmatic, historical views about questions of implementation.

In this regard, he follows Rousseau who in his Social Contract presented an attempt to bring together justice and utility Rousseau , esp. Consequently, a particular theory can become moot, in that it supplies answers for which there is no longer any need. Since extant moral theories were developed in answer to historically localizable and context-related questions and problems, we can recommend thinking about what questions we might ask in ethics today and in the future.

Note that we are thereby saying nothing about absoluteness or the sense or possibility of it in ethics and morality. Every language reflects a distinctive way of living. This becomes obvious, for example, if we look at the various ways of closing a letter; anyone who has ever tried to find the appropriate words to finish a letter written in a foreign language has encountered these stumbling blocks.

But there are differences between discussions of the same theory within different language communities — some strands of discussion are confined by language of publication or by a vision of philosophy, for example, in parallel discussions within continental and analytic philosophy. And sufficiently disparate languages with different grammatically basic categories can certainly make the understanding of a theory at least very difficult. Interestingly, this connection between the questions different moral theories were built to answer plays a fundamentally different role in the context of moral theories than in the context of other scientific theories: in physics, different questions succeeded each other and led to different answers, but the resultant theories replaced each other.

Remarkably, the questions to which moral theories give answers do not turn out to be superseded in this way. Due to the aims of this paper, this is not the place to discuss virtues and their values, as it is similarly not the place to discuss the other aspects of moral theories which we are selecting for discussion.

We can certainly wonder whether this capability of thinking in terms of laws, and thus prescinding from personal interests, gives rise to respect for the law; in any case our ability to reason enables us to resolve contradictions and has to be valued if we want to speak about moral decision making in a meaningful way. On the one hand, we have to admit that if we have too many conflicting personal principles, we can no longer be oriented by them; moreover, a principle is only a principle if it is not only applicable once but applies in several sufficiently similar contexts.

Of course, Kant continues far beyond this point: non-contradiction is the touchstone for the moral approval of the use of a maxim.

On the other hand, there are indications that contradictions are worth maintaining or at least not to be resolved by all means. Rousseau declares that he prefers to be a man of contradiction to a man of prejudices. It seems quite plausible that, in order for inner coordination to provide orientation, freedom from contradiction is needed.

Nonetheless, to make every contradiction disappear would mean to diminish our inner versatility. The discussion of related possibilities and impossibilities, important values and interests that have to be taken into account, and ways to determine the goodness of consequences is immense. For present purposes, that is, in order to illustrate how thinking about strengths of specific moral theories may help to find spheres in which they could be especially helpful, I will only focus on one thought concerning the second phase of the concept — even if, of course, that does not do justice to the richness of this group of moral theories.

With Esperanto, there was a famous attempt to create a common world language; it is by now clear that the initiative was unsuccessful.

The feeling of disgust we get if we utter an invented word with invented derivative syllables. Parfit In contrast to the thoughts presented here, these are attempts to pick out specific parts of the different theories to create a further theory. Here, the aim is to preserve the different theories as such. Dagmar Borchers is developing a multilevel model that sees, for example, the strength of consequentialism in the weighing in case of conflicts between duties, and thereby proposes another way to think about different theories jointly.

It is encouraging that we often seem to agree about the weak point of a moral theory. But the phenomenon still needs to be investigated. Korsgaard It is not the place to discuss them here: I want to sketch out only those criteria closely connected to the argumentation developed here; the listed criteria certainly can and have to be complemented. Anscombe, G. Elizabeth M. Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy, 1— Article Google Scholar. Crisp, Roger ed. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics.

Cambridge: CPU. Roger Crisp. Barbery, Muriel. The Elegance of the Hedgehog. He couldn't bear the cold of Alaska after living in the heat of Texas.

He has been accused of theft, but we What was one of the significance impacts of the scientific revolution Weegy: One of the significant impacts of the scientific revolution is that it resulted in developments in mathematics, Wind erosion is most common in flat, bare areas User: A logical Blood is transported from the right and left ventricles of the heart Fill in the blank.

Weegy: One of the best reasons to write is to express what we think. Aristotle warns that the virtuous mean is not a strict mathematical mean between two extremes. For example, if eating apples a day is too many, and eating zero apples is too little, this does not imply that we should eat 50 apples, which is the mathematical mean. Instead, the mean is rationally determined, based on the relative merits of the situation.

I have sufficiently stated that moral virtue is a mean and in what sense it is so. It is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency, and it is such because its character is to aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions. It is no easy task to be good, since in everything it is no easy task to find the middle. For example, not everyone can find the middle of a circle, but only those who know how. Similarly, anyone can get angry, which is easy, or give or spend money.

But is not for everyone, nor is it easy to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way. For this reason, goodness is rare, praiseworthy and noble. Thus, according to Aristotle, it is often difficult to live the virtuous life primarily because it is difficult to find the proper mean between the extremes.

A second approach to moral principles is duty theory , the view that moral standards are grounded in intuitive obligations, or "duties", that we have. A duty is a moral obligation that someone has towards another person, such as my duty not to lie to you. Duty theories of ethics emphasize the need to follow moral rules that we know instinctively and discover through human reasoning. Duty theories of ethics are also called deontological theories, from the Greek word deon meaning "duty".

There have been many versions of duty theory, but we will look at two representative ones. The most influential duty theory in recent centuries is that by German philosopher Immanuel Kant Kant argues that there is a single, foundational principle of moral duty that encompasses all of our specific moral obligations, and this principle is revealed to everyone through rational intuition.

The obligatory force of each of these depends entirely on whether you have a particular desire that you are trying to fulfill. None of these are genuine moral rules and are more like words of advice. If an action is morally right, you are obligated to perform that action, regardless of what your private desires are.

This principle rests on a common distinction in moral theory between intrinsic value and instrumental value. These things are good only as a means to some further end.

By contrast, things that have intrinsic value are good in and of themselves, irrespective of any function that they perform. For Kant, human dignity is the best example of something that is intrinsically valuable: its value is independent of any function that it performs. The point of the categorical imperative is this: we should always treat people with dignity as ends in themselves , and never use them as mere instruments.

For Kant, we treat people as an end whenever our actions toward someone reflect the inherent value of that person. Donating to charity, for example, is morally correct since this acknowledges the inherent value of the recipient.

By contrast, we treat someone as a means to an end whenever we treat that person as a tool to achieve something else. It is wrong, for example, for me to steal my neighbor's car since I would be treating her as a means to my own happiness. Kant explains here how theft violates the categorical imperative:.

He who transgresses the [property] rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as a means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of containing in themselves the end of the very same action. The categorical imperative also regulates the morality of actions that affect us individually.

Suicide, for example, would be wrong since I would be treating my life as a means to the alleviation of my misery. Kant believes that the morality of all actions can be determined by appealing to this single principle of duty.

However, a second example of duty theory, put forward by British philosopher William D. Ross — , sets forth a collection of several moral rules that we must follow, rather than just a single one. For Ross, there are seven such fundamental moral duties, which he thinks are intuitively obvious:.

Fidelity: the duty to keep promises. Reparation: the duty to compensate others when we harm them. Gratitude: the duty to thank those who help us. Justice: the duty to recognize merit. Beneficence: the duty to improve the conditions of others.

Self-improvement: the duty to improve our virtue and intelligence. Non-harm: the duty to not injure others. Ross recognizes that there may be others to add to this list, but these are ones that we all know self-evidently. Suppose, for example, that my Aunt Martha asks me what I think about her new hat.

My personal opinion is that her hat is ugly, even though I recognize that other people her age might feel differently. This creates a conflict between my two duties of fidelity and non-harm. Which should I follow? In this situation, my greater obligation is to avoid hurting her feelings. Thus, by themselves, my duties of fidelity and non-harm are equally valid prima facie duties, but in this situation it is only the duty of non-harm that emerges as my actual duty.

According to Ross, there is no way to rank order the priority of our duties beforehand, and so we cannot know ahead of time which will be the stronger duty.

We must wait until a conflict arises in a particular situation, and we must use our own insight in that situation to determine which of our two conflicting duties is our actual duty. The third approach to moral standards is consequentialism , the view that an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable. It is common for us to determine our moral responsibility by weighing the consequences of our actions.

Donating to charity is the right thing to do because of all the good that it does. Stealing is morally wrong because of the harm that it causes. According to consequentialism, correct moral conduct is determined solely by this type of cost-benefit analysis. Consequentialism requires that we first tally both the good and bad consequences of an action. Second, we then determine whether the total good consequences outweigh the total bad consequences. If the good consequences are greater, then the action is morally proper.

But if the bad consequences are greater, then the action is morally improper. Consequentialist theories are sometimes called teleological theories, from the Greek word telos , which means end or goal.

Consequentialist theories became popular in the 18th century by philosophers who wanted a quick way to morally assess an action by appealing to experience, rather than by appealing to gut intuitions or long lists of questionable duties. In fact, the most attractive feature of consequentialism is that it appeals to publicly observable consequences of actions.

There are three main types of consequentialist theories:. Ethical Egoism : an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable only to the agent performing the action.

Ethical Altruism : an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone except the agent. Utilitarianism : an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone.

All three of these approaches focus on the consequences of actions for different groups of people, and often they will produce different moral conclusions. Here is an example. An American woman was traveling through a developing country when she witnessed a car in front of her run off the road and roll over several times. She asked the hired driver to pull over to assist, but, to her surprise, the driver accelerated nervously past the scene.

A few miles down the road the driver explained that in his country if someone assists an accident victim, then the police often hold the assisting person responsible for the accident itself. If the victim dies, then the assisting person could be held responsible for the death. The driver continued explaining that road accident victims are therefore usually left unattended and often die from exposure to the country's harsh desert conditions. On the principle of ethical egoism, the woman in this illustration would only be concerned with the consequences of her attempted assistance as she herself would be affected.

The decision to drive on would be the morally proper choice. On the principle of ethical altruism, she would be concerned only with the consequences of her action as others are affected, particularly the accident victim. Tallying only those consequences reveals that assisting the victim would be the morally correct choice, irrespective of the negative consequences that result for her.

On the principle of utilitarianism, she must consider the consequences for both herself and the victim. The outcome here is less clear, and the woman would need to precisely calculate the overall benefit and disbenefit of her action to herself, her family, the victim, and the victim's family. According to Bentham, we should determine whether an action is right or wrong by calculating the total amount of pleasure and pain resulting from the action as everyone is affected.

Two features of his theory are important. First, he proposed that we tally only the pleasure and pain which results from our actions since, he argued, pleasure and pain are the guiding forces of human nature:. Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.

On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.

For example, we value acts of loyalty and friendship, yet they are not always pleasing. Rather than focusing on pleasure and pain, they argued, we should instead tally more generally the good and bad that results, or the benefit and disbenefit. Is it right for me specifically to cheat on my calculus exam this afternoon? This aspect of Bentham's theory is known as act-utilitiarianism because of its focus on the consequences of the specific actions that we perform.

One criticism is that, based on act-utilitarianism, it would be morally wrong for me to waste my time on leisure activities such as watching television, since my time could be spent in ways that produced a greater social benefit, such as charity work.

However, according to the critic, prohibiting leisure activities does not seem reasonable, and virtually no other moral theory condemns us for at least occasionally being leisurely. Also, the critic argues, based on act-utilitarianism, we could morally justify actions that we ordinarily find reprehensible, such as torturing a specific captured enemy to get information from him, or enslaving a small group of people to help make life easier for a larger group of people.

It just depends on whether the total pleasure outweighs the total pain as we tally the consequences of the specific action. However, according to the critic, we commonly believe that all acts of torture are morally wrong, regardless of the benefit that may result. Thus, act-utilitarianism has some serious flaws as a moral theory. A revised version of utilitarianism called rule-utilitarianism addresses the above problems with act-utilitarianism. Rather than focusing on the consequences of each particular action that we perform, we should instead examine the consequences of more general behavioral rules that we adopt.

Thus, according to rule-utilitarianism, a behavioral rule is morally right if the consequences of adopting that rule are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone.

In turn, the rule against stealing is morally binding because adopting this rule produces favorable consequences for everyone. The moral issues that we have looked at so far focus primarily on the moral obligations that one person has to another person, such as the moral obligation that I have to not steal from you. Another aspect of ethical theory concerns the moral obligations that societies and governments have to its citizens.

Where do governments get their governing authority to begin with? What is their primary responsibility to their citizens? Are there moral limits to the demands that governments can make upon their citizens? There is a moral underpinning to the role that governments play, which is often crucial in determining the moral values that society endorses. We will look at three issues: social contract theory, natural rights theory, and principles of governmental coercion.

Social contract theory was championed by Thomas Hobbes, and his theory has two parts: the state of war that naturally exists between people, and the social contract that enables us to rise out of that state of war. As to the state of war, Hobbes argues that in our natural condition, prior to the creation of any government, each person attempts to survive by any means possible. We are fundamentally selfish creatures that look out for our own best interests, and there is a scarcity of natural resources that we need to survive.

The result is a war of all against all, and even when we are not actually combating with each other, we are prepared to do so at the slightest provocation.

As long as we are in this warring condition, civilized society is not possible and even basic efforts to till the soil and build homes will be futile. Hobbes writes,. Thus, life is so bad in the state of nature that we will accomplish very little during the miserable and short lives that we have. According to Hobbes, just as human selfishness creates this mess to begin with, it is also human selfishness that offers us a way out: life in the state of nature is so miserable that we are willing to make compromise to bring about a state of peace.

That compromise is the social contract. We agree to set aside our hostilities towards each other in exchange for the peace that a civilized society offers. What we need is a governing power to monitor our conduct and punish us when we break the rules of peace. While none of us likes the government breathing down our backs, it is one more critical sacrifice that we need to make to secure a state of peace.

The social contract that we arrive at must include the creating of a ruling government since, Hobbes argues, strong governmental authority is the only way to ensure that we follow the rules of law. After Hobbes proposed his theory, critics challenged several of its major assumptions. Are humans in the natural condition really as selfish and nasty as Hobbes claims? If not, then the rationale for making a social contract falls apart. Also, very few societies were historically founded on any kind of social contract: most were done through military force with no agreement from its citizens.

Further, even if a government was founded through a contractual agreement, why would that contract be binding on future generations of citizens? Defenders of social contract theory have responded to these and other criticisms, and the theory continues to be an important moral justification for governmental authority. Debates today about social contract theory focus on whether governments are justified in going beyond their basic job as protectors of peace.

Should the government tax us to pay for space exploration, public television, or even public school? Libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick writes,. The minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified. Yet many persons have put forth reasons purporting to justify a more extensive state.

According to libertarians, we put governments in power through the social contract to keep the peace, and every extra thing the government does unnecessarily infringes on our liberties. This includes public funding of education, welfare programs, highway construction, you name it. As nice as these things are, the government is not justified in forcing us to pay for them through taxation. If we want them, we should voluntarily pay for them through a user fee.

Governments have a duty to elevate the status of underprivileged citizens through education and welfare programs, and taxation to support these programs is justified. The key point of dispute between libertarianism and welfare liberalism is the social contract itself: when forming a social contract, what kinds of conditions would a reasonable negotiator agree to?

Libertarians argue that negotiators would want to retain as much freedom as possible and reject most government programs. But welfare libertarians argue that negotiators would want to make sure that society is as fair and equal as possible, and this will embrace a wider set of government programs.

Many applied ethics controversies come right down this debate between libertarianism and welfare liberalism, such as government funding of health care, higher education, and efforts to reduce poverty. Rights Theory. One of the most important moral notions connected to the functioning of governments is that of rights.

There are, though, two distinct types of rights: natural rights are those that we are born with, and legal rights are those that are created by governments. Natural rights have three features traditionally associated with them. First, they are natural in the sense that we have them as part of our natural human identity, and they were not conferred on us by any governments.

While governments might endorse moral rights, such as the right to freedom of thought, they do not create those rights. Second, they are universal insofar as they do not change from country to country.

When people talk about these areas, they are usually discussing an area of ethics known as normative ethics, or the process of considering and determining ethical behavior. While this idea initially may seem appealing, particularly with a field that has a core duty to the public, it does not provide a solid ethical framework for decision-making.

There are three main concerns that seem to arise when public relations professionals rely on utilitarian ethics to make decisions.

First, rather than looking at the choice or action itself, decision-makers are forced to guess the potential outcomes of their choice in order to determine what is ethical.

In other words, if a solution drastically harms a minority group, would it be ethical if the majority benefited from that decision? This seems to contradict the goal of public relations to build mutually beneficial relationships, regardless of the number of people in a particular stakeholder group. The third objection is that it is not always possible to predict the outcome of an action. Using outcomes as a measurement of ethics will not, therefore, provide an accurate way for professionals to measure whether decisions are ethical.